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 Abstract: 
Given the limited capabilities on R&D and global distribution channels, 
and the virtual non-existence of patented drugs, the Chinese pharmaceuticals 
industry has little chance to enter the global market of Western prescription drugs 
and compete with the established global giants head-on. The reality is that they are 
chasing a moving target and their competitors are becoming bigger and stronger 
day by day. The substantial reduction of import tariffs and the granting of 
comprehensive trading and distribution rights to foreign-financed firms after the 
WTO accession, effectively tilted the level-playing field against the Chinese 
pharmaceuticals industry. Given the short-term competitive advantages of Chinese 
pharmaceuticals industry on Chinese drugs, three development strategies are 
suggested: (1) consolidate local market of herbal and generic drugs, (2) market 
Chinese drugs via the Internet, and (3) outsource R&D and collaborative 
marketing. 
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1 Introduction 
The pharmaceuticals industry underwent massive consolidation in the 
1990s due to a combination of three factors. First, the cost of discovering and 
developing new drugs is increasing exponentially due to the high cost of 
equipment and highly skilled scientists demanded by genetic research, and the 
expensive human clinical trials needed in order to satisfy regulatory authorities. 
Second, the global reach of sales and marketing channels is increasingly important 
in order to gain and to maintain a market share.1 Third, the booming stock market 
and the shareholders’ pressure to sustain the high profit margin drove the sector to 
develop ‘blockbuster drugs’ (those that can earn US$1 billion or more), something 
only the largest ones can afford to do. Therefore, a bigger pharmaceutical 
company with teams of research and development (R&D) and global sales forces 
in different therapeutic categories has the competitive advantage over their 
competitors. This explains the unprecedented mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
frenzy in the 1990s, which involved approx three dozen drug companies 
(including about half of the top 25 drugs companies). The value of pharmaceutical 
mergers reached US$290 billion between 1995 and 1999, including the formation 
of AstraZeneca and Aventis.2 As the threshold of critical mass to conduct research 
on a broad scale and to have global development and distribution capabilities is 
changing overtime, further market consolidation may reduce the number of major 
pharmaceutical companies from 35 to less than 12 over the next decade.3 
                                                 
1 Permission to advertise prescription drugs on television in the US since 1997 has increased the 
marketing costs tremendously. Since the US is the only developed country with no price control on 
prescription drugs and allows direct advertisement, all major drug companies are targeting this 
higher value-added market (the US market have skyrocketed from US$38 billion in 1990 to 
US$100 billion in 1998). In the US, it is estimated that it costs up to US$1 billion plus a 1,000 
strong sales-force to market a new drug in its first two years. Subsequently, drug companies spent 
US$1.9 billion on direct-to-consumer advertising in 1999; see Financial Times,  (8 November 
1999), p. 21 and (23 November 1999), p. 35 (http://www.ft.com); International Herald Tribune, 
(25 January 2000), p. 9 (http://www.iht.com). 
2 In the first two months of 2000 alone, a staggering of US$282 billion of M&A deals (including 
Pfizer acquired Warner-Lambert, Glaxo-Wellcome merged with SmithKline Beecham to form 
Glaxo-SmithKline, and Pharmacia & Upjohn has agreed to merge with Monsanto to establish 
Pharmacia) have been agreed; see Financial Times, (17 January 2000), p. 18. 
3 International Herald Tribune, (25 January 2000), p. 9. The industry had about 80 major 
companies in the mid-1980s. 
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After the Chinese delegate signed the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
accord in Doha on 12 November 2001, China formally agreed on the accession 
treaties after 15 years of on-and-off negotiations.4 During the last few years when 
the US and China governments were negotiating the treaty for WTO accession, a 
number of reports have focused on the possible effects and implications on a 
number of strategic industries. For instance, Graham and Liu, Wei, and Blumental 
analyse the impact on automobile, finance and banking, telecommunication and 
agricultural sectors.5 Despite being regarded as one of the largest potential 
markets for drugs in the world and classified as one of the strategic industries 
along with the oil and gas, iron and steel by the Beijing government, there is little 
comprehensive investigation on the effects of WTO accession on Chinese 
pharmaceuticals industry. Chow and Fung analyse the effects of foreign 
investment on the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry and White and Liu 
investigates the performance of 66 Chinese pharmaceutical manufacturers by 
using efficiency-oriented parameters.6 Using the case studies approach, Nolan, 
                                                 
4 China was one of the signatories of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in April 
1948 but the Taiwan Nationalist government withdrawal from the GATT in March 1950. In 1984, 
China was granted the observer status and formally applied for the GATT membership in 1986. 
For the historical background and politics about the WTO accession, see Kym Anderson, ‘On the 
Complexities of China’s WTO Accession’, World Economy 20(6), (September 1997), pp. 749-772; 
Harry Hongyi Lai, ‘Behind China’s World Trade Organization Agreement with the USA’ Third 
World Quarterly 22(2), (April 2001), pp. 237-255; Yongzheng Yang, ‘China’s WTO Accession: 
The Economics and Politics’ Journal of World Trade 34(4), (August 2000), pp. 79-94; K Zeng, 
‘Domestic Politics and the US-China WTO Agreement’ Issues & Studies 37(3), May-Jun 2001, pp. 
105-141. Created in 1995, the WTO is an inter-governmental body comprising the majority of the 
world’s countries. Based on the spirit of classical liberalism and the rule of law, the purpose of 
WTO is to promote multi-lateral trade through reduction in obstacles erected by individual 
countries to global trade in goods and services, settle trade disputes and lay down rules governing 
international trade. Although decisions are normally arrived at through consensus of all members, 
WTO actions are based on non-discrimination and equal treatment of member countries. The WTO 
accession for China demanded a number of areas for liberalisation ranging from tariffs reduction to 
quotas elimination. In return, the US government granted the Permanent Normal Trade Relations 
(PNTR, formally called the Most Favoured Nation or MFN) status to China, which levies the same 
level of tariffs on Chinese and other US’s major trading partners imports, effectively on 1 January 
2002. The will also ended the application of the US’s Jackson-Vanik amendment, which requires 
communist countries to show they do not restrict emigration before they can be granted the normal 
trading relations, see South China Morning Post, (28 December 2001) (http://www.scmp.com). 
5 Edward M. Graham and Ligang Liu, ‘Opening China’s Bond Market – Catalyst to further 
Reform and a Jumpstart to the Stalled WTO Accession Negotiations’, Journal of World Trade 
32(4), (August 1998), pp. 5-19; Zhao Wei, ‘China’s WTO Accession – Commitments and 
Prospects’, Journal of World Trade 32(2), (April 1998), pp. 51-76; D. M. Blumental, ‘Applying 
GATT to Marketizing Economies: The Dilemma of WTO Accession and Reform of China’s State-
owned Enterprises (SOEs)’, Journal of International Economic Law 2(1), (March 1999), pp. 113-
154. 
6 C. K. W. Chow and M. K. Y. Fung, ‘Health Care Reform, Foreign Direct Investment and their 
Impact on the Pharmaceutical Industry in China’, Asian Economies 25(3), (September 1996), pp. 
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Wang and Yeung investigate the competitiveness of a particular pharmaceutical 
firm, Sanjiu Group.7 They all provide useful information and analysis but none of 
them analyse the effects of WTO accession on the pharmaceuticals industry. 
Chen,  and Yu, Zheng and Song did cover pharmaceuticals in their studies on the 
impacts of WTO accession but neither of them is comprehensive.8 
To fill in the literature gap, this paper investigates the implications of 
WTO accession on the pharmaceuticals industry in China. This paper focuses on 
the differences of production and R&D capabilities between the Chinese 
pharmaceuticals industry and the global giants as well as the development strategy 
for the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry. While the actual effects of the WTO 
accession on the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry is still uncertain, the 
preliminary assessment based on existing information can still shed light on the 
level of competition that the Chinese drug companies will encountered in the near 
future. This has tremendous implications on the direction of future policy 
implemented by the State Drug Administration (SDA) in China. For instance, 
should the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry maintaining their ‘to conquer the 
world strategy’? How long can the competitive advantages of Chinese 
pharmaceuticals industry on herbal medicine over their global giant’s counterparts 
sustained? What development strategy should the Chinese pharmaceuticals 
industry pursue after the WTO accession? It must be emphasised that the focus of 
this paper is on pharmaceuticals (generic and patented drugs). Other consumer 
healthcare products that are included in the product portfolios of pharmaceutical 
companies (e.g. Johnson & Johnson) will not be analysed. 
The background and the possible impacts of the WTO accession on the 
Chinese pharmaceuticals industry will be presented and assessed in sections 2-3. 
                                                                                                                                      
55-74; S. White and X. L. Liu, ‘Organizational Processes to meet New Performance Criteria: 
Chinese Pharmaceutical Firms in Transition’, Research Policy 27 (4), pp. 369-383. 
7 Peter Nolan, Xiaoqiang Wang and Godfrey Yeung, Globalisation, Industrial Concentration and 
Catch-up in Pharmaceuticals: The Case of China’s Sanjiu Group, (Sino-Indian Liberalisation 
Research Project Discussion Paper No. 5, Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, England, 1998). 
8 Yuming Chen, Zhongguo jiaru WTO ge hangye qianjing fenxi [The Prospects of Chinese 
Industries after the WTO Accession] (Beijing: Economic Daily Publishing House, 2000); 
Yongding Yu, Bingwen Zheng and Hong Song, eds, Zhongguo rushi yanjiu baogao: Jinru WTO 
de zhongguo chanye [Research Reports on the WTO Accession of China: The Analysis of Chinese 
Industries] (Beijing: Social Sciences Documentation Publishing House, 2000). 
11/09/06  4 
Before concluding the major findings of this paper in section 5, three development 
strategies for the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry will be outlined in section 4. 
2 Background of the Chinese Pharmaceuticals Industry 
China is an important pharmaceuticals market. At US$13.24 billion in 
2000, the total value of pharmaceutical sales accounted for about one-third of the 
East Asian market outside Japan.9 It was the same size as the combined markets of 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia, and was more than double that 
of India.10 From the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, output of both Western and 
traditional Chinese medicines increased more than fourfold.11 
Despite the fast growth of output and consumption, per capita 
pharmaceuticals consumption in China was still small in international terms. In 
1995, it was less than US$3/person, compared to US$132/person in the UK, 
US$334/person in the US and US$488/person in Japan.12 It was also much smaller 
than in neighbouring East Asian developing countries, where the comparable 
figures were US$13/person in Malaysia, US$16/person in the Philippines, 
US$47/person in Hong Kong and US$75/person in Taiwan.13 It is expected that 
the Chinese market will grow from the world’s ninth largest to one of the largest 
in the world. Not only will demand rise due to increases in incomes, but also 
China is likely to have a rapidly ageing population in the next century, which will 
tend to boost demand for pharmaceuticals even further.14 
                                                 
9 South China Morning Post, (28 June 2001). 
10 Morgan Stanley Dean Writer, The Asian Edge: A Closer Look, (29 May 1998), p. 151. 
11 State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian [China Statistical Yearbook] (Beijing: China 
Statistical Publishing House, 1981 to 1995 issues) 
12 The per capita pharmaceuticals consumption in China increased to US$5.5 a year in 2000; see 
South China Morning Post, (15 May 2001). 
13 Morgan Stanley Dean Writer, The Asian Edge: A Closer Look, p. 151. 
14 Western diets and western illness following the increase in wealth: infectious diseases are 
replaced by diseases of affluence, e.g. diabetes, asthma, cancer, heart conditions, obesity and 
depression. For the issues of ageing and medical care in China, see The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, Financing Health Care: Issues and Options for China, 
(Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1997); The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, Old Age Security: Pension Reform in China, (Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 
1997); H. Naci Mocan, Erdal Tekin and Jeffrey S. Zax, The Demand for Medical Care in Urban 
China, (NBER Working Paper Series 7637, April 2000), (http://www.nber.org/papers/w7673); T. 
Ping, ‘On the Issues of Population Ageing and Population Control in China’, Social Sciences in 
China XVIII(3), (1997), pp. 129-138. 
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2.1 Domestic liberalisation 
China’s pharmaceutical industry was under tight state control before the 
government allow competition to develop among suppliers since the mid-1980s. 
As controls were relaxed, the industry was able to earn relatively high profits. 
However, even in the late 1990s, China’s large, old-established state plants 
remained quite tightly controlled by the government, with production and sales 
‘tasks’ for its main products. These plants mainly produce relatively capital-
intensive upstream intermediate pharmaceuticals, especially off-patent antibiotics, 
which are then processed by smaller factories, as well as producing generic, low-
margin final products, e.g. penicillin and aspirin. Many of these were on a 
downward spiral, with obsolete equipment, poor research facilities and a high 
debt-asset ratio. By contrast, manufacturers of traditional Chinese medicines and 
foreign-funded enterprises enjoyed much greater freedom to set prices. 
Despite formal liberalisation, the de facto intervention in the market 
remained as a large fraction of pharmaceuticals are prescribed by hospitals, mostly 
run by the state. These are gradually moving towards financial autonomy. The 
proportion of healthcare costs, including medicines, that must be financed by the 
individuals employed in state institutions is rising, providing an incentive to 
source drugs from the lowest-cost source. In fact, the central government recently 
issued formal directives and informal instructions to hospitals and healthcare 
centres to buy local products. To combat the over-supply and its financial impact 
in the domestic pharmaceuticals industry, the Beijing government banned the 
imports of ten drugs, including Vitamin C and penicillin, in 1999.15 To reduce the 
widespread over-prescription abuses that drove up pharmaceutical spending to 
more than 60% of total health care costs, the government introduced a multi-
faceted price control system on imported drugs and those manufactured by Sino-
foreign joint ventures (JVs).16 The price ceiling would be fixed after the authority 
compared the quality and price of the import drug with the generic versions 
manufactured by domestic or other developing countries pharmaceuticals firms. 
                                                 
15 South China Morning Post, (6 February 1999). 
16 The new system is introduced to replace the price capping system in place since 1996; see 
Financial Times, (1 June 2000), p. 13. 
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The State Development Planning Commission suggests that the profits for generic 
and patents drugs should be restricted at 10% and 25%, respectively.17 
Alongside product market liberalisation, the pharmaceuticals sector 
gradually liberalised the structure of ownership, as emerging firms sought capital 
in the face of declining direct investment sources from the state. An important 
facet of this was raising funds on the stock market. By the end of 2000, there were 
about 60 pharmaceuticals corporations listed in the stock markets in Shenzhen, 
Shanghai and Hong Kong. For example, Shandong Xinhua was able to generate 
280 million yuan of capital by listing its H-shares on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange in December 1996, while Sanjiu Medical and Pharmaceutical (a unit of 
Sanjiu Group) raised 1.67 billion yuan by listing its A-share (for domestic 
investors only) on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in November 1999.18 M&A is 
becoming more common. One of the most important M&A deals is the merger of 
the Shandong Xinhua Pharmaceutical Group and the Shandong Lukang 
Pharmaceutical Group in 1999.19 The combined company, Shandong Xinhua 
Lukang Pharmaceutical Group, is controlled by Shandong provincial government. 
In 1998, the third largest Chinese drug company had a turnover of 3 billion yuan, 
profits of 300 million yuan, total assets of 4.1 billion yuan and 20,000 of 
employees.20 
2.2 International liberalisation 
Foreign investment in the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry was permitted 
from early on in the reform process. By the mid-1990s, following the gradual 
liberalisation of the domestic industry, investment had increased to significant 
levels. By 1999, there was a total of about 1,800 pharmaceutical JVs. 
                                                 
17 Financial Times, (15 July 1999), p. IV and (1 June 2000), p. 13. 
18 Editorial Board of China Pharmaceutical Yearbook, Zhongguo yiyao nianjian 1998 [China 
Pharmaceutical Yearbook 1998] (Beijing: China Pharmaceutical Technology Publication, 1998), 
p. 260; Financial Times, (2 November 1999), p. 34. 
19 Shandong Xinhua mainly engage in developing and manufacturing of bulk pharmaceuticals, 
which include antipyretic and analgesic medicines (mainly analgin, aspirin, aminopyrine and 
ibuprofen), antiseptic medicines (pipemidic acid), central nervous system medicine (caffeine) and 
cerebrovascular medicines (nimodipine). Shandong Xinhua is the largest producer of antipyretic 
and analgesic drugs in China. 
20 South China Morning Post, (1 January 1999). 
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Most (20 out of the biggest 25) of the world’s top pharmaceutical 
companies set up JVs in China. Bristol-Myers Squibb’s JV in Shanghai (Shanghai 
Shiguibao) was set up in the mid-1980s, and by 1996, it claimed to account for 
20% of the Chinese vitamin market and 80% of the Chinese multi-vitamin market. 
By 1997, SmithKline Beecham’s JV in Tianjin (Tianjin SmithKline) had become 
one of China’s top ten pharmaceutical companies by value of sales, and a large JV 
with US$100 million investment was due to be opened in Shanghai in 1999 (Table 
1). Jannsen (Belgium) set up a large JV in Xian (Xian Yangseng) in the mid-1980s 
which had grown to be the fourth largest pharmaceuticals company in China by 
1997. Glaxo-Wellcome invested US$124 million in Suzhou to produce anti-
hepatitis B tablets (lamivudine), a drug developed and designed for the Chinese 
market, after securing a Class 1 drug certification with an eight-year exclusive 
manufacturing right in China.21 JVs were also set up by Schering Plough and 
Johnson & Johnson in Shanghai, Merck in Hangzhou and Eli Lilley in Suzhou. By 
1997, it was estimated that Western medicines accounted for around 60% of the 
total value of medicines consumed in major cities.22 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The multinationals brought technology and new standards of management 
to the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry. They also brought a portfolio of high-
margin patented drugs, e.g. lamivudine. From 1993 onwards, China basically 
applied internationally recognised practice in respect to intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) for pharmaceuticals patented in other countries, protecting the company 
concerned from cloning of the product by local producers. The leading JVs, such 
as Xian Jannsen and Tianjin SmithKline, were able to generate much greater total 
profits than their leading indigenous competitors, and dramatically higher ratios of 
profits to sales and assets, e.g. Tianjin SmithKline recorded a profits-sales ratio of 
63%, which was at least 20% higher than the other nine top pharmaceutical 
corporations in China in 1997 (Table 1). 
                                                 
21 South China Morning Post, (9 January 1999 and 15 April 1999). It is estimated that there are 
120 million hepatitis B carriers in China and 10% of them may develop chronic hepatitis B. The 
wholly foreign-owned Suzhou plant also used to manufacture antibiotics currently made in the UK 
and sold in China. The plant can be used by Glaxo-Wellcome to side-step the “buy local” 
directives; see Financial Times, (15 July 1999), p. IV. 
22 China Daily: Business Weekly, (14 December 1997). 
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2.3 Industrial structure 
Under the command economy, the largest pharmaceutical manufacturers 
were the traditional state producers of Western medicines, mainly antibiotics. The 
largest of these were the Huabei plant at Shijiazhuang and the Dongbei plant in 
Shenyang, with over 7,000 employees each.  
In the emerging market economy, entities with the characteristics of a 
genuine ‘firm’ began to take shape. The relatively large profits obtained in the 
sector led to a wave of new plants being established across the country. In 1987, 
there were over 2,600 enterprises producing medical and pharmaceutical products, 
with almost 700,000 employees.23 By 1997, the number of pharmaceutical 
enterprises in China had risen to 3,411, an extraordinarily large number for a 
market of China’s size.24 There were almost 3,000 tiny labour-intensive, 
handicraft enterprises, producing a single product under primitive conditions, 
without benefit from economies of sale or scope. These accounted for about 80% 
of the total number of enterprises in the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry, but for 
only 15% of the industry’s total output value.25 Indeed, in 1997, each of the 
enterprise size groups of below 30 million yuan (roughly US$3.7 million) per 
annum made losses (Table 2). 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The vast bulk of the industry’s profits were generated by the largest 
enterprises, which increasingly benefited from economies of scale and scope, with 
better technology and quality control, more modern management systems, brand 
names and growing marketing systems. In 1997, enterprises with annual sales of 
over 100 million yuan (around US$12 million) accounted for around one-half of 
the pharmaceutical industry’s fixed assets, two-thirds of its sales value and the 
sectors’ value-added (Table 2). However, within the largest size group of 
pharmaceutical firms, the firm-level concentration was still low. In 1997, the top 
                                                 
23 State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1988, p. 298. 
24 In 1998, there were 6,391 drug companies (including 1,790 JVs) in China, with a total 
production value of 163 billion yuan. The industrial profits on sales averaged 5.91% and the 
industrial profit-assets ratio was 5.52% (down from 20.38% in 1991); see South China Morning 
Post, (1 November 1999). 
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ten and twenty firms had a total market share of just 16% and 22%, respectively 
(Table 1). In the international market, the corresponding market shares of the top 
ten and twenty firms were 36% (pro-forma 43% in 1998) and 56%, respectively.26 
Sales and profits of the leading firms were tiny compared to the global industry. In 
1997, China’s top ten pharmaceutical firms had an average annual sales of only 
around US$207 million and an average annual pre-tax profits of around US$45 
million. At US$28 billion in 1999, the pro-forma sales value of Pfizer-Warner-
Lambert was double the amount of the total sales value (about US$13 billion) of 
the whole Chinese pharmaceuticals industry!27 The world best selling drug, Losec 
(for anti-ulcer), manufactured and marketed by AstraZeneca reached US$5.6 
billion in 1999.28 This is 175% higher than the sales value of the top twenty 
pharmaceuticals corporations (US$3.2 billion) in China in 1997! The pro-forma 
pre-tax profits of Glaxo-SmithKline reached more than US$7.8 billion in 1999, 
which was more than four times higher than the corresponding figure recorded in 
the entire Chinese pharmaceuticals industry in 1997!29 Undeniably, the gap in 
terms of the absolute value of sales and pre-tax profits between the Chinese 
pharmaceuticals industry and the global giants is insurmountable in the near 
future. 
3 The WTO Accession: David Vs Goliath? 
According to the WTO accord signed in November 2001, the major areas 
of liberalisation relating to the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry are as follows: 30 
• Import tariffs will be reduced by about 60%, from an average of 9.6% to 4.2%, 
before 1 January 2003. 
• Chinese quotas and other quantitative restrictions will grow from the current 
trade level at 15% per annum and to be phase-out no later than 2005. 
                                                                                                                                      
25 Editorial Board of China Pharmaceutical Yearbook, Zhongguo yiyao nianjian 1998, pp. 398-
422. 
26 Financial Times, (4 February 2000), p. 28; IMS, The Pharmaceutical Market World Review 
1997, (1997) (http://www.imshealth.com). 
27 Financial Times, (20 January 2000), p. 28 and (8 February 2000), p. 34. 
28 Financial Times, (23 November 1999), p. 35 and (7 December 1999), p. 28. 
29 Financial Times, (17 January 2000), p. 18 and (18 January 2000), p. 23. 
30 White House, White House Factsheets: Pharmaceuticals, (2000) 
(http://www.uschina.org/public/wto/factsheets/pharmacy.html); Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
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• China will provide comprehensive trading (import and export) and distribution 
(wholesaling, retailing, transportation, etc., including the provision of services 
and the goods made in China) rights to foreign-financed firms for the first 
time. Trading and distribution rights will be phased in progressively over three 
years. 
• China will eliminate and cease enforcing contractual requirements on trade 
and foreign exchange balancing, and local contents upon the WTO accession. 
• China will only impose and enforce laws or other provisions relating to the 
transfer of technology or other know-how, if they are in accordance with the 
WTO agreements on the protection of IPRs and trade-related investment 
measures. 
• China will ensure that the sales and purchases of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and state-invested enterprises (SIEs) are based solely on commercial 
considerations, such as price, quality and marketability, rather than 
‘government procurement’. Moreover, the SOEs and SIEs are under the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, e.g. no export 
subsidies. 
• The US will be allowed to keep its anti-dumping methodology (regarding 
China as a non-market economy) for 15 years after the WTO accession. 
Apart from the tariffs reduction, quotas elimination and IPRs protection, 
the foreign-financed firms have for the first time been granted trade and 
distribution rights in China. To gauge the possible impact of these trade 
liberalisation measures on the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry, two important 
questions are asked. Without the government subsidiary and various forms of 
administrative protection, will the existing comparative advantages of Chinese 
pharmaceuticals industry in the domestic market be maintained? In other words, 
can the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry maintain their domestic market share? 
Will the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry be competitive globally before the 
market is fully liberalised within the next three to five years? In other words, will 
the WTO accession of China generate golden opportunities or be a deadly blow to 
the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry? 
                                                                                                                                      
Economic Cooperation, Compilation of the Legal Instruments on China’s Accession to the World 
Trade Organization, (2001) (http://www.moftec.gov.cn/moftec_cn/wto/wtolaw.html) 
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To answer the above questions, the competitive advantages of Chinese 
pharmaceuticals industry is analysed from two benchmarks: (1) R&D capability 
and product portfolio, and (2) production capability and market share. 
3.1 R&D capability & product portfolio 
As one of the ‘strategic industries’, China’s goal is to be ‘one of the 
world’s pharmaceutical giants by the middle of the next century’.31 To achieve 
this aim, China recognises that it must develop its own R&D capabilities in order 
to produce patent drugs to compete in the international market. The central 
government promised that it would support R&D in the sector through research 
conducted at the China Administrative Centre for New Drug Research and 
Development, under the SDA. 
In terms of R&D capability, the Chinese pharmaceutical firms are not only 
miles behind the global giants, but also well behind their Japanese counterparts, 
who are using herbal ingredients in their products. Between 1985 and 1998, only 
62 out of 1,500 new medicines developed in China met international standards 
and merely two were original products with a unique chemical structure.32 
Moreover, not a single Chinese chemical drug had achieved an international 
patent. For chemical drugs, the fact is that the R&D budget of a mediocre 
Japanese company is higher than that for the whole Chinese pharmaceuticals 
industry. For instance, the whole Chinese pharmaceuticals industry spent one 
billion yuan (about US$121 million) on R&D in 1998, which is even lower than 
the US$134 million spent by Ono Pharmaceutical (Japan), which ranked 74th in 
the international R&D league.33 The R&D expenditure of the entire Chinese 
pharmaceuticals industry is about 3.4% of the US$3.59 billion spent by Aventis 
and 4.8% of the US$2.5 billion spent by Merck (the top R&D spender before the 
formation of Glaxo-SmithKline and Pfizer in 2000-2001). With an average R&D 
intensity (ratio of R&D expenditure to the sales value) of less than 1%, the 
Chinese pharmaceuticals industry also spend much less proportionally than the 
                                                 
31 China Daily: Business Weekly, (14 December 1997). 
32 Financial Times, (15 July 1999), p. IV; South China Morning Post, (1 November 1999). 
33 It must be emphasised that the inter-country comparison of R&D capability is suffered from the 
drawbacks of fluctuation on currency exchange rate and the differences on real costs (productivity) 
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global giants. In a stark contrast, the global giants spend an average 10-19% of its 
revenues on R&D.34 The R&D gap between the global giants and the Chinese 
pharmaceuticals industry can be further illustrated by the comparison of the R&D 
expenditure of the former and the sale value of the latter. In 1997, the total sale 
value of the entire Chinese pharmaceuticals industry was about US$14.1 billion, 
which is even lower than the US$16.57 billion spent by the top 10 global giants on 
R&D (Table 3). In fact, the total sale value of Chinese pharmaceuticals industry 
accounted for only about 26% of the total R&D expenditure spent by the major 
Western pharmaceutical corporations. In the late 1990s, the discovering and 
development costs of a new drug is estimated to be about US$500-600 million and 
the estimated minimum level of R&D investment necessary for a global drug 
company to remain competitive ranges between US$1.5-2 billion per annum.35 As 
a result of focusing their huge R&D budgets on a few selected areas, the emerging 
patterns of sectoral global dominance is clearly illustrated by the therapeutic 
market share of the global giants. In terms of market share, Glaxo-SmithKline 
ranked first in three therapeutic categories (anti-infective, respiratory, and 
antibiotics and vaccines) and second in another two therapeutic categories (central 
nervous system, and alimentary and metabolic) in 1998.36 Moreover, it is a world 
leader in automated combinatorial chemistry, genomics, bioinformatics and DNA 
microchips. AstraZeneca is a world leader in gastro-intestinal (including ulcers), 
cardiovascular, cancer and oncology.37 Obviously, the gap in R&D capabilities 
                                                                                                                                      
of R&D scientists. Given the lack of alternative benchmark, however, the R&D expenditure is 
used as the ‘second best’ indicator to illustrate the R&D capability. 
34 South China Morning Post, (1 November 1999); Department of Trade and Industry, The UK 
R&D Scoreboard 1999, (Innovation Unit, DTI, UK Government, 1999) 
(http://www.dti.gov.uk/finance). 
35 Financial Times, (16 March 1998), p. 5 and (15 March 1999); Centre for Medicines Research, 
CMR International 1998 Annual Report, (1999) (http://www.cmr.org/1998/8.htm). From 1994 to 
1998 alone, annual R&D expenditure for the top ten pharmaceutical companies rose from US$9.8 
billion to US$17.5 billion, an annual rate of increase of 16%. 
36 Financial Times, (18 January 2000), p. 23. 
37 Despite the fact that the R&D expenditure has quadrupled in real terms during the last two 
decades, the number of innovative new products surviving the toxicology testing and clinical trials 
has actually decreased from 60 per annum in the mid-1980s to about 4 per annum. A top-tier 
pharmaceutical company is only able to introduce a new drug once every 27 months on average. 
Andersen Consulting estimates that, in order to sustain the average 10% growth per annum in the 
industry, the top ten pharmaceutical companies will each have to launch five important new drugs 
a year with annual sales of US$350 million for each product. However, none of them has such a 
strong pipeline. The ten leading companies were each able to launch an average of only 0.45 new 
drugs per annum between 1990 and 1994 and only 8% of those new products had sales value of 
US$350 million. Moreover, the patents of 100 medicines, with annual sales of US$35 billion, will 
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between the global giants and the Chinese counterparts is simple insurmountable 
in the near future. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
As the R&D expenditure of the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry accounts 
for only about 20% of the discovering and developing costs of a new drug in the 
West, it is no longer surprising that not a single Chinese chemical drug has 
obtained an international patient. The lack of R&D capability in the Chinese 
pharmaceuticals industry also partly explains why the parallel imports, localisation 
(herbal versions of the patented drugs, which claimed to have the same effects) and 
other forms of blatant violation of IPRs, especially the violation of brands and patent 
infringements (from local imitations of the drugs to cheap copies of packaging 
containing only a placebo) are not uncommon in China. Likewise, it is no surprise 
that some small-scale drug companies take the cheap option in producing imitated 
products. The lack of communication between the complex web of ministries, 
government departments, bureaux and agencies responsible for managing and 
policing the industry also facilitates the IPRs violation. The classical case of 
violation of IPRs is Vigara. Although without the government approval, all forms of 
Vigara, either via smuggled imports or local imitations, were on sales in China just 
weeks after Pfizer launched its patented version.38 This explains why the global 
giants have only a 25% of market share in China, one of the lowest penetration rates 
in Asia.39 
As part of an effort to join the WTO, the Chinese government has 
implemented a series of reforms to strengthen the protection of IPRs. In 1998, the 
restructuring of bureaucracy is expected to clarify the lines of control over the 
industry and improve the protection of brands and patents for drugs. The State 
Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) was re-launched to be responsible for the 
administration of pharmaceutical companies, while the newly established SDA 
(formally known as the State Pharmaceutical Supervision Administration) supervises 
                                                                                                                                      
expire between 2000 and 2002. See Financial Times, (16 March 1998), p. 2 and (28 October 
1999), p. VII. 
38 In 2000, the Chinese authority eventually allowed Pfizer to sell Vigara in China after almost two 
years of clinical trial. 
39 Financial Times, (15 July 1999), p. IV. 
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research, production, distribution and use of pharmaceuticals. The Ministry of Health 
will oversee all hospitals and healthcare centres. But the long-term effects of such 
restructuring on the industry are still unknown since the restructuring of the local 
drug administration bureaux (which normally have close ties to local drug companies 
and hospitals) is still underway. Nonetheless, there are some significant 
improvements on the implementation of IPRs in China. For instance, Beijing has 
banned the best-known mainland version of the Viagra, made by Shenyang Feilong 
Health Products.40 
The R&D in the pharmaceuticals industry is a long-term and risky 
investment. The restriction of government subsidies on SOEs and SIEs after the 
WTO accession will certainly limit the channels of funding for the pharmaceuticals 
industry. As they are subjected to hard-budget constraints, the R&D budgets must be 
sourced from internal capital. Worse still, the Chinese banking sector is not keen to 
provide credit for R&D. Without the capital to conduct R&D on Western drugs, the 
Chinese pharmaceuticals industry is likely to be confined in the vicious circle of low 
value-added generic drug production and low profit-margin businesses. 
3.2 Production capability & market share 
The Chinese pharmaceuticals industry is well behind the global giants in 
production capability, especially in high value-added drugs and quality control. In 
terms of production value, the largest Chinese pharmaceutical firm, Huabei, had 
output value of 3.54 billion yuan (about US$428 million) in 1998, which is about 
2.5% of the prescription drug sales of Merck.41 The entire Chinese 
pharmaceuticals industry produced 163 billion yuan (about US$19.69 billion) of 
drugs and healthcare products in 1998, which is about US$9 billion smaller than 
the US$28 billion recorded in Glaxo-SmithKline.42 In fact, the production value of 
the whole Chinese pharmaceuticals industry is not much higher than the US$17 
billion of prescription drug sales of Merck.43 Similar pattern appeared in the sale 
value, where the total sale value (including sales of non-prescript drugs) of the 
entire Chinese pharmaceuticals industry was only 16% of the prescription drug 
                                                 
40 Financial Times, (15 July 1999), p. IV. 
41 South China Morning Post, (1 November 1999). 
42 Financial Times, (18 January 2000), p. 23. 
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sales recorded by the top 10 global giants in 1997 (Table 3). For individual 
corporation, there is not a single Chinese pharmaceutical corporation recorded a 
sale value higher than 3.5% of their global giant’s counterparts in 1997. With the 
multi-billion dollars mega-mergers undertaking in the pharmaceuticals industry 
since 1997, the absolute gap in production capability between the global giants 
and the Chinese players is widening all the time. Apart from manufacturing low 
value-added generic drugs, the poor quality control of the Chinese 
pharmaceuticals industry in general also prevents a large proportion of their 
output being exported.44 This partially explains the low production value of the 
industry. As it can cost up to 50 million yuan to upgrade the facilities, industrial 
analysts expected that about one-third of Chinese pharmaceutical firms could 
close for failing to meet the internationally recognised Good Manufacturing 
Practice (GMP) standard by the 2004 deadline.45 
In China, the distribution of medicine is largely monopolised by the 
16,000 state-owned wholesales outlets at various level all over the country. 
However, the overwhelming majority of them are too small to enjoy the 
economies of scales as less than 400 of them have annual sales of over 20 million 
yuan. Their average profit-margin was below one percent in 1999 and about half 
of them recorded severe losses. To address the existing inefficient and antiquated 
distribution system, the Pharmaceuticals Department under the SETC is planning 
to allow private entrepreneurs and foreign investors to invest in the medicine 
distribution sector by forming joint-stock or limited companies by 2003. In fact, at 
least five Chinese pharmaceutical firms have signed contracts or letters of intent to 
establish Sino-foreign joint-chain stores, e.g. U.S.’s Wal-Mart and Chinese 
Associated Guangzhou Pharmaceutical are co-operating retailing in Shenzhen. 
The Pharmaceuticals Department is also planning to reduce the number of 
wholesales outlets dramatically to between 45 and 50 over the next five years 
through M&As.46 
                                                                                                                                      
43 Financial Times, (4 November 1999), p. 32. 
44 The poor capability of quality control is especially pronounced among the army of small-scale 
pharmaceutical firms scattered all over China. 
45 South China Morning Post, (3 August 2000). 
46 South China Morning Post, (11 July 2000, 3 August 2000, 8 September 2000 and 27 November 
2001). 
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Although the global giants may still only account for 25% of the Chinese 
drug market, their rate of market penetration is rising rapidly. If the market share 
of foreign-financed JVs is included, it is estimated that the global giants account 
for about one-third of the Chinese drug markets.47 The global pharmaceuticals 
giants spent an astonishing 20% of their sales value on the marketing.48 With 
much deeper pockets on marketing and sales, the global giants can establish their 
distribution channels on their own and/or through acquisitions in China by 2003. 
The recent government measures to separate hospitals and dispensaries, allowing 
patients to buy prescriptions at retail outlets of their own choosing, further open 
the market to foreign-financed drug distributors.49 
The market of Chinese herbal drugs is basically monopolised by the 
locally-funded firms. This pattern is expected to be continued, at least in the short 
to medium-terms. China has a long history of experience in classifying and 
‘testing’ traditional medicines. Unlike Western patented medicines, the 
development of the bulk of these products were attributable mainly to the 
knowledge accumulated over centuries by unknown practitioners of traditional 
Chinese medicine, and cannot be patented under either Chinese or international 
law. By 1997, there were 1,013 enterprises producing traditional medicines, 
compared to 1,544 producing Western medicines.50 The two sectors have very 
different economic characteristics. The unit value of Western medicines was far 
higher than for Chinese medicines. In 1997, Western medicines accounted for 
68% of the pharmaceuticals industry’s fixed assets, 63% of the sector’s total sales 
value and 47% of it’s total profits (Table 2). Despite the absence of patents for 
most products, many of the most successful Chinese medicines are able to 
command premium prices. In 1997, Chinese traditional medicine enterprises 
accounted for only 18% of the sector’s fixed assets and 22% of the sector’s sales 
value, but they accounted for 30-38% of the sector’s value-added and net profits. 
Moreover, Chinese medicines achieved a ratio of profits to sales of 10.57% 
compared to 4.54% for Western medicines, and a ratio of profits to fixed assets of 
18.47% compared to 6.19% for Western medicines. The largest size group of 
                                                 
47 South China Morning Post, (1 November 1999). 
48 Financial Times, (21 June 2000), p. 24. 
49 South China Morning Post, (3 August 2000). 
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traditional Chinese medicine producers achieved a ratio of profits to sales of 
17.16%, and a ratio of profits to fixed assets of 45.25%. Partly due to the lower 
required investment in R&D, Chinese medicine manufacturers are able to earn 
profits even though they operate at a smaller scale than chemical pharmaceuticals 
manufacturers. For instance, Chinese medicine firms with gross output value of 
10-30 million yuan are profitable, while chemical pharmaceuticals firms are only 
profitable with gross output value of 30-50 million yuan. 
With the Goliath (global giants) growing day-by-day, while David (the 
Chinese firms) remains under-nurtured, it is likely that the gap of R&D and 
production capabilities on chemical drugs between them will only be increased. The 
fact is that David is chasing a moving rather than a static target! The Chinese herbal 
drug is probably the only category in which the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry 
has potential international competitive advantages in the short- to medium-term. 
4 Development Strategies for the Chinese 
Pharmaceuticals Industry 
From above, it is obviously that the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry is 
unable to compete head-on with the global giants on Western drugs. Given the 
competitive advantages of the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry on Chinese 
drugs, three short and long-term development strategies are suggested: (1) 
consolidate the local market of herbal and generic drugs, (2) market Chinese drugs 
via the Internet, and (3) outsource R&D and collaborative marketing. 
4.1 Consolidate the local market of herbal & generic drugs 
The sales value of western drugs has grown by 10-12% per annum since 
1997 and the value of the Chinese pharmaceuticals market is expected to exceed 
US$10 billion in 2000.51 The Chinese market is still much smaller than the US$46 
billion recorded in Japan and US$89 billion recorded in the US, but it is as big as 
                                                                                                                                      
50 Editorial Board of China Pharmaceutical Yearbook, Zhongguo yiyao nianjian 1998, pp. 398-
399. 
51 Financial Times, (15 July 2000), p. IV. 
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the Italian and British markets in 1999.52 If the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry 
can accelerate the long overdue consolidation (via M&As and closing down 
thousands of poorly equipped and non-profitable small drugs firms which produce 
one to two products) and maintain their existing market share of 75% after the 
WTO accession, this is equivalent to about US$10 billion in 2000. As China is 
likely to be one of the world biggest drug markets in the future, there is still plenty 
of prospect for further growth for the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry. 
The deteriorating market share of the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry on 
the global natural drugs scene illustrates the urgency of consolidation. In 1998-
2000, the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry accounted for a mere 3-5% of the 
US$15-16 billion of global market on herbal drugs (the market is about US$30 
billion if natural cosmetics, health foods and flavouring are included). Despite 
centuries of experience in the application of herbal medicines, the Chinese 
pharmaceuticals industry is not only well behind the international leaders on 
herbal drugs, such as Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, but also behind Singapore, 
Indonesia and Thailand as most of the Chinese products failed to meet 
international quality standards.53 In stark contrast, US companies account for 
about 50% of the global drugs market (Asian firms account for less than 10% of 
the market). The US-based Metabolife will spend US$11 million in the next three 
years on marketing its Chinese herbal products in China.54 Undeniably, the 
competitive advantage of the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry with regard to 
herbal drugs, the only area in which it can be competitive internationally, is 
slipping away quickly. There is simply no room for complacency! 
Given the high growth rate of the Chinese drug market, it is not 
implausible that the global giants will move into the manufacturing and 
distribution of herbal drugs in the near future. Given the fact that there is no 
international patent protection on herbal drugs and their strong R&D capabilities, 
the global giants can easily enter the Chinese drug market shortly through 
                                                 
52 IMS, IMS Health Drug Monitor, (2000) (http://www.imshealth.com). 
53 China mainly exports raw herbs, which are in turn processed by importing countries and 
marketed as higher value-added herbal drugs; see South China Morning Post, (1 November 1999 
and 10 May 2001). 
54 Mark Mitchell, ‘Tradition at Risk’, Far Eastern Economic Review 163(29), (20 July 2000), p. 
37. 
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‘reverse-chemical-engineering’ and/or the transfer of know-how via JVs with 
Chinese firms.55 Once the global giants establish their manufacturing and 
distribution networks, it is not inconceivable that they can ‘beat the Chinese 
pharmaceutical firms at their own games’! Therefore, it is plausible that the first 
priority of the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry is to consolidate the domestic 
market of herbal and generic drugs, before the ‘reverse-engineering’ by the 
Western giants, rather than by trying to conquer the global market prematurely.56 
Getting the priority wrong, as with the exiting ‘to conquer the world’ strategy, the 
Chinese pharmaceuticals industry may ended up losing both of the domestic and 
international markets of herbal and chemical drugs. 
4.2 Market alternative remedies via IT 
The argument on consolidation of local market does not imply that the 
Chinese pharmaceuticals industry should not look at the overseas markets. It is 
merely argued that the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry should consolidate the 
local market first, before diverting their scarce resources to develop the overseas 
markets. 
With the advancement of information technology, it is suggested that the 
Chinese pharmaceuticals industry can not only utilise the technology to reduce 
R&D costs, but can also market alternative remedies (including Chinese drugs) on 
the Internet. As all packaged Chinese medicines are sold as dietary supplementary 
(which do not require regulatory approvals or proof of efficacy in most countries), 
marketing (based on consumers’ belief) is the key to success.57 With the support 
from the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry, the SDA can co-ordinate the effort and 
set up an official website.58 The proposed multi-lingual interactive website is a 
                                                 
55 The decision by the US’s National Institute of Health to spend US$50 million per annum in the 
research of efficacy of traditional Chinese medicine is one of the signals that the West is preparing 
to enter the Chinese market; see Mark Mitchell, ‘Tradition at Risk’, Far Eastern Economic 
Review, p. 37. 
56 Recently, Sanjiu and Wanji Pharmaceutical planned to open up to 10,000 chain-store pharmacies 
each in China within the next five years is apparently one of the important strategic moves to 
consolidate their market shares in China; see South China Morning Post, (28 June 2001). 
57 Mark Mitchell, ‘Tradition at Risk’, Far Eastern Economic Review, p. 38. 
58 There are a number of websites offering medical information in China. However, they are not 
organised and some of them contain misinformation. At the moment, the most authoritative one 
may be the forthcoming website (PRC-medical.com) set up by a Hong Kong-based Internet service 
provider, Speednet Communications, Bozhou government of Anhui province and the China Centre 
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‘one-stop’ online healthcare provider for customers (patients and hospitals), 
medicinal practitioners (including doctors), pharmaceutical providers (including 
drugs manufacturers, distributors and suppliers) and other relevant institutes (such 
as medicinal insurance companies) of Chinese medicine: it provides authoritative 
and up-to-date information about alternative remedies and herbal medicines, on-
line diagnosis, on-line pharmacy backed up with mail-order service on ‘certified 
herbal drugs’ (i.e. no fake or intimated drugs), offer visitors’ subscriptions to e-
mail updates on their areas of interests, discussion forums and web-links to the 
participating Chinese pharmaceutical companies, etc. Moreover, it can improve 
the acceptance of Chinese drugs in the Western societies as this can dispel the 
mysteries and misinformation of such treatments.59 Without the need to establish a 
distribution channel and all the associated overhead costs, this application of 
information technology is a cost-effective way to pave the way to enter the 
Western market via brand name establishment and marketing. 
The market potential of on-line healthcare provider is increasingly realised 
by analysts. However, a number of big pharmaceutical websites are not well 
developed, providing only static or even out of date information, e.g. 
www.bayer.com contains information on a suspected trial for lung cancer.60 
Therefore, there is still a virgin market on the internet to be conquered by Chinese 
pharmaceuticals industry. 
4.3 Sub-contracting of R&D & collaborative marketing 
To be approved by the regulatory authority, every new drug must undergo 
a series of expensive clinical trials. To improve the cost effectiveness of new drug 
                                                                                                                                      
for International Pharmaceutical Exchange. Speednet invests 100 million yuan to build a database 
of 600 types of popular Chinese medicines and 300 lesser-known treatments and an on-line market 
information and order system; see South China Morning Post, (19 January 2000). The other 
websites, such as Medicinechina.com, JK123.com and Daoyi.com, contain only information on 
simplified versions in Chinese and is intended for people living in the mainland only. Sanjiu and 
several leading Chinese pharmaceutical firms are planning to establish a global on-line network for 
diagnosis and prescriptions. Sanjiu also interested in being the project leader of the proposed 
Chinese medicine centre in Hong Kong, with an investment of about US$2.3 billion; see South 
China Morning Post, (2 August 2000). 
59 The lack of authoritative and self-monitoring organisation on alternative remedies is one of the 
biggest obstacles to gain acceptance in the Western societies, e.g. almost no medical insurance 
company in the West recognises the benefits of alternative remedies and allows their policy-
holders to claim consultation fees. 
60 Financial Times, (3 February 2000), p. 13 and (21 June 2000), p. 24. 
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research and shorten the time-lag of the development cycles, more and more big 
pharmaceutical companies sub-contract the research and clinical trails of new 
drugs to biotechnology companies or contract research organisations (CROs), e.g. 
Quintiles.61 The years of premium pricing enjoyed by patented drugs are over as 
every company is racing against time to push their products into the market, e.g. 
Merck’s super-aspirin Vioxx followed Pfizer’s Celebrex on to the market after just 
a few weeks. It is estimated that up to 25% of the research budgets of big 
pharmaceutical companies is spent on alliances with biotechnology companies 
offering compounds, projects or drug-discovering tools, creating a global market 
of US$6.6 billion. To lower the overhead costs of new drugs introduction, 
especially in the US where salesforce with expertise on the product is essential, 
drug companies has employed collaborative marketing for years. Several Japanese 
drug companies take this strategy further by being ‘pure research organisations’ 
and out-sourced their manufacturing and overseas marketing.62 
Given the fact that Chinese pharmaceutical firms are unlikely to develop 
all-around R&D capability in the medium-term, outsourcing the R&D from 
western biotechnology companies is one of the ways to improve their pipelines 
within a shorter period of time. This strategy also allows Chinese pharmaceutical 
firms to concentrate their scarce capital on certain R&D areas that have 
competitive advantages.63 In fact, the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry can 
enhance their competitive advantages through specialisation and division of 
labour, i.e. develop several ‘pure research organisations’ (as with their Japanese 
counterparts) to complement the major integrated large pharmaceuticals firms. It 
must be emphasised that the contracted out (out-sourcing) of R&D is not an 
alternative means to replace in-house R&D capability. In-house R&D capability is 
still required for the long-term development of drug companies, e.g. the 
knowledge to choose research projects with potential of success. 
                                                 
61 Other global giants, such as Johnson & Johnson and Warner-Lambert, acquired biotechnology 
companies to enhance their in-house R&D capabilities in five separate deals worth more than 
US$15 billion in 1999; see Financial Times, (28 October 1999), p. I. 
62 Financial Times, (15 July 1999), p. V. 
63 However, this outsourcing strategy demands a sustainable amount of foreign capital, in which 
most of the Chinese pharmaceutical firms does not have (partly due to foreign exchange control 
and the inconvertible of Chinese currency). 
11/09/06  22 
Chinese pharmaceutical firms can also consider being engaged in 
collaborative marketing with the global giants in the future, especially on globally 
marketable products. Through demonstration effects, Chinese pharmaceutical 
firms can learn the direct-to-customers (or consumer-oriented) marketing skills 
and the profit-sharing-based collaborative marketing scheme can be considered as 
the ‘tuition fees’ levied by the global giants. Therefore, the possibilities of such an 
arrangement should not be ruled out in the medium- to long-term. 
5 Conclusions 
With limited capabilities on R&D and global distribution channels as well 
as the virtual non-existence of patented drugs, the Chinese pharmaceuticals 
industry has little chance of entering the global market of Western prescription 
drugs and to compete with the established global giants head-on. The reality is 
that they are chasing a moving target and their competitors are becoming bigger 
and stronger every day. The substantial reduction of import tariffs and the 
granting of comprehensive trading and distribution rights to foreign-financed 
firms by 2003 effectively tilted the level-playing field against the Chinese 
pharmaceuticals industry, as the global giants can penetrate the Chinese market 
with all their available weapons, ranging from direct importation, manufacturing 
and distributing locally or through their exclusive global sourcing, marketing and 
distributing channels. Equipped with much deeper pockets and backed-up by 
much stronger R&D capabilities and product pipelines, it is only a matter of time 
before the global giants can overwhelm the Chinese pharmaceuticals market, 
provided that the SDA and the industry maintain their ‘to conquer the world’ 
strategy. 
The grim reality is that there is not a single Chinese pharmaceutical firm 
with a R&D budget remotely capable of rival their Japanese counterparts, whose 
R&D budgets are already much lower than their Western counterparts. In fact, 
Japan has several pharmaceutical firms who are successfully manufacturing and 
marketing medicines with herbal ingredients, e.g. Takeda. Given the fact that the 
Japanese pharmaceutical firms already have a certain degree of knowledge on 
the usage of herbal medicines and equipped with a much stronger R&D team and 
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marketing personnel, it is argued that they (rather than the global giants) are the 
major competitors to Chinese pharmaceutical firms (even in the Chinese 
market). This is because the Chinese pharmaceutical firms have virtually no 
chance of overtaking the global giants in the near future, yet it is more realistic to 
regard the Japanese pharmaceutical firms as their competitive targets. 
Even in herbal medicines, the only pharmaceutical (health care) product 
with which the Chinese pharmaceutical industry has competitive advantage over 
the Western giants, the long-term prospect is not as bright as assumed by the 
SDA. The lack of patent protection on herbal medicine means that any of the 
established giants in the West can form JVs or even take over local 
pharmaceutical plants and enter the market within a short period of time. It is 
possible that the Western giants can conquer a significant proportion of Chinese 
drugs in the coming decades. Several profitable large Chinese pharmaceutical 
firms, such as Sanjiu, can survive the competition through strengthening their 
product pipelines and market shares in China. However, the majority of small and 
medium-size pharmaceutical firms are likely to be either taken over, merged or 
their operations closed altogether. If the market of the Chinese medicine is 
profitable, with their powerful multi-billion budget on R&D, it is relatively easy 
for the Western giants to ‘reverse-engineering’ the chemical components of herbal 
medicine, mass manufacturing and then marketing under their brand names and 
distribution channels. Therefore, it is not inconceivable that the Western 
pharmaceutical giants can beat the Chinese counterparts in their own game. 
If the above arguments hold any water, they also implicitly suggest that the 
existing business strategy (the so-called ‘national champion’ and ‘to conquer the 
world’) of the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry (including some large Chinese 
pharmaceutical firms, notably Sanjiu) is intrinsically flawed.64 First, the objective 
to nurture its ‘national champions’ to become the world’s largest pharmaceutical 
firms is too naive. Even with central government support, the benchmark is too 
high and almost impossible for any Chinese pharmaceutical firm or even the 
whole industry to achieve under the present fiercely competitive business 
                                                 
64 Apart from the establishment of 100 new franchised clinics in the US, Europe and Hong Kong 
between 2002 and 2004, Sanjiu is negotiate to acquire a pharmaceutical plant in the US as part of 
its overseas expansion moves; see South China Morning Post, (10 May 2001). 
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environment in the industry. Second, the priority of market domination is 
incorrect. They have to consolidate their own market locally before spending their 
scarce resources to develop overseas markets. It may be more cost-effective for 
them to divert the resources from the expansion of overseas markets to enhance 
their R&D capabilities, including the ‘Westernisation of herbal drug’ (herbal drug 
in pills or injection) and the possible application of herbal drugs on chronically 
illness (the areas where existing Western drugs have limited effectiveness). The 
Chinese pharmaceuticals industry can also outsource the R&D from Western 
biochemical firms to improve their pipelines and competitive advantages within a 
shorter period of time. The logic is simple and clear: the bigger the firm, the 
higher the investment and costlier the price of failure when the industry (firm) is 
non-competitive globally. 
Furthermore, the intrinsic flaw of the existing business strategy of the 
Chinese pharmaceuticals industry also reveals similar and the equally flawed 
business strategy of big businesses implemented by the central Chinese 
government as ‘big’ may not be equivalent to economies of scale. Size per se is 
not the sufficient condition to success (or having competitive advantages over 
competitors). In capital-intensive (both human capital in terms of R&D capability 
and monetary capital) sectors where China has little prospect of catching-up with 
the global giants, including the pharmaceuticals, it is cost-efficient for the industry 
to focus on the niche market (such as the application of information technology on 
herbal medicine on marketing as mentioned above) rather than competing with the 
global giants head-on. Rather than improving their competitiveness, a head-on 
collision with the global giants is likely to crush the local pharmaceuticals 
industry completely!
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Table 1: The Top 20 Pharmaceutical Corporations in China by Market Share, 1997 
Sales Output Pre-tax profits 
Fixed 
assets Pharmaceutical Corporations 










Huabei (North China)         3,049         2,875           460        3,142 2.61% 106% 15.08% 14.63% 
Jinan Sanzhu         2,536         2,333           514           267 2.17% 109% 20.26% 192.78% 
Shenzhen Nanfang (Sanjiu)         2,055         2,065           445           657 1.76% 100% 21.68% 67.80% 
Xian Yangseng (Janssen)         1,719         1,691           636           229 1.47% 102% 37.00% 277.71% 
Beijing Tongrentang         1,715            447           130           540 1.47% 384% 7.59% 24.12% 
Shanghai shi         1,701            554             61           206 1.46% 307% 3.57% 29.46% 
Shandong Xinhua         1,576         1,087           172           838 1.35% 145% 10.89% 20.47% 
Guangzhou Baiyunshan         1,380         1,201             59           502 1.18% 115% 4.27% 11.74% 
Wuhan Gongtaokai         1,260         1,598           550             89 1.08% 79% 43.61% 618.45% 
Tianjin SmithKline         1,111         1,243           704           308 0.95% 89% 63.38% 228.56% 
Top 10:       18,101       15,094        3,730        6,777 15.52% 120% 20.61% 55.04% 
Sichuan Taiji         1,059            727             44           252 0.91% 146% 4.11% 17.31% 
Shandong Lukang            939            899           138           596 0.81% 104% 14.68% 23.12% 
Harbin            935            951             80           607 0.80% 98% 8.54% 13.16% 
Zhuhai Lizhu            908            686           146           713 0.78% 132% 16.12% 20.52% 
Dongbei (Northeast)            877            773 n/a        1,299 0.75% 113% n/a n/a 
Hebei            783            809           105           372 0.67% 97% 13.38% 28.14% 
Shenzhen Ribaolaifu            705            735             74 n/a 0.60% 96% 10.55% n/a 
Shijiazhuang            700            605             44           481 0.60% 116% 6.34% 9.22% 
Shanghai Shiguibao (Bristol-Myers Squibb)            642            837             66           252 0.55% 77% 10.35% 26.36% 
Oumulong            538            443 n/a             83 0.46% 122% n/a n/a 
Top 20:       26,187       22,558        4,428       11,431 22.45% 116% 16.91% 38.73% 
China:     116,619     142,994       14,492       78,708 100% 82% 12.43% 18.41% 
Source: compiled and calculated from Editorial Board of China Pharmaceutical Yearbook, Zhongguo yiyao nianjian 1998. [China Pharmaceutical 
Yearbook 1998] (Beijing: China Pharmaceutical Technology Publication, 1998), pp. 398, 410, 422 and 434-461. 
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Table 3: The Top 10 Pharmaceutical Corporations by Market Share and by R&D Expenditure, 1997 
The Global Giants: China: 


















Merck & Co., US 11,224 Novartis, Switzerlandb 2,241 Huabei (North China) 368 3.28% 16.44% 
Glaxo-Wellcome, UKb 10,980 Hoechst, Germany 1,964 Jinan Sanzhu 306 2.79% 15.60% 
Novartis, Switzerlandb 10,492 Johnson & Johnson, US 1,892 Shenzhen Nanfang (Sanjiu) 248 2.37% 13.12% 
Bristol-Myers Squibb, US 9,028 Roche, Switzerlandb 1,760 Xian Yangseng (Janssen) 208 2.30% 11.80% 
Johnson & Johnson, US 8,540 Pfizer, USb 1,705 Beijing Tongrentang 207 2.43% 12.15% 
Pfizer, USb 8,296 Glaxo-Wellcome, UKb 1,670 Shanghai shi 205 2.48% 12.30% 
American Home Products, US 8,052 Merck, US 1,489 Shandong Xinhua 190 2.36% 12.79% 
SmithKline Beecham, UKb 7,320 American Home Products, US 1,382 Guangzhou Baiyunshan 167 2.28% 12.06% 
Hoechst, Germany 6,832 Rhône-Poulenc, French 1,251 Wuhan Gongtaokai 152 2.23% 12.17% 
Eli Lilly, US 6,344 Bristol-Myers Squibb, US 1,222 Tianjin SmithKline 134 2.12% 10.99% 
Top 10: 87,108  16,576  2,187 2.51% 13.19% 
Total: 244,000  53,835  14,089 5.77% 26.17% 
Sources: calculated from Department of Trade and Industry, The UK R&D Scoreboard 1999 (Innovation Unit, DTI, UK Government, 1999) 
(http://www.dti.gov.uk/finance); Centre for Medicines Research, CMR International 1998 Annual Report (1999) 
(http://www.cmr.org/1998/8.htm); IMS, The Pharmaceutical Market World Review 1997 (1997) (http://www.imshealth.com); Editorial 
Board of China Pharmaceutical Yearbook, Zhongguo yiyao nianjian 1998. [China Pharmaceutical Yearbook 1998] (Beijing: China 
Pharmaceutical Technology Publication, 1998) 
Notes: 
a: Estimated from the exchange rate of US$1=8.2773 yuan 
b: Glaxo-Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham merged and formed Glaxo-SmithKline in 2000, Pfizer merged with Warner-Lambert in 2000 and 
Novartis may merge with Roche after acquired 20% of its shares in 2001. 
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Table 2: Selected data on China’s Pharmaceuticals Industry in China 








assets Gross value of output (in yuan): 



































































































































































































Source: compiled and calculated from Editorial Board of China Pharmaceutical Yearbook, 
Zhongguo yiyao nianjian 1998. [China Pharmaceutical Yearbook 1998] (Beijing: 
China Pharmaceutical Technology Publication, 1998), pp. 398-399, 410-411 and 
422-423. 
Note: The sum of the above figures is below the national value since the pharmaceuticals 
industry including other sectors, e.g. medical equipment, etc.
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